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Three Sessions of Legislating
Humanitarian Law: Forward March,
Retreat, or Parade Rest?t
In 1974 the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Re-affirmation and
Development of Humanitarian Law began efforts to add two Protocols to the four
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. (This had been preceded by a series of
preparatory meetings sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.)1 After the third session of the Conference in
1976, the two draft Protocols were still under negotiation. A fourth and hopefully
final session will run from Easter, 1977, to mid-June. Rumour has it that the
Swiss government, which funds these Conferences as the depository for the
Geneva Law on war victims, has some reservations about additional cost
burdens-the third session alone is said to have directly cost that government in
the neighborhood of ten million Swiss francs-excluding the delegates' salary,
travel and support.
Having endured three extensive sessions of negotiations, it is fair to inquire
whether the participants are getting their money's worth. Much of each draft
Protocol has been tentatively approved-viz., adopted in committee. One can
thus explore what has been achieved so far, and what is likely to be the basic
nature of the final product of this Conference-the first of its kind in at least
twenty-five years. Is the Conference moving forward or backward, or not
moving at all? And what does "movement" mean in relation to legislating the
humanitarian law of armed conflict?
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Associate professor of political science, University of Nebraska.
tThe author was an observer at the first two Geneva Conference sessions as a representative of an
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'The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presented proposals to the Diplomatic
Conference after hosting the meetings of experts. See ICRC, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS:
COMMENTARY (1973). For further background, see especially G. Schwarzenberger, From the
Laws of War to the Laws ofArmed Conflict, 17 J. oF Pun. L. 61-77 (1968); and G.I.A.D. Draper,
Ethical and Juridical Status of Constraints in War, 55 MIL. L. REv. 169-85 (1972).
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What follows is an attempt to provide a brief answer to such questions, and in
so doing to focus upon the final session; it is in no sense an exhaustive review of
the draft Protocols in detail.
Possible Backward Movement
An observer who follows the proceedings of the Conference-who interviews
delegates and tries to produce a balance sheet of that meeting-faces a
bewildering array of opinions. For every positive or negative view encountered,
there seems to be a countervailing attitude. Perhaps this is to be expected in a
Conference of some 130 states, of three major political groupings, crosscut by a
half-dozen regional or ethnic groups, themselves split by various legal, political,
economic or philosophical tendencies. At least it does permit one to examine
certain hypotheses from differing points of view. From this approach, four
possible major problems can be identified, after the three legislative sessions.
1. Legal Complexity and Unclear Language
There is no doubt about the law being complex, when and if approved by the
Conference. The first Protocol, additional to all four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and pertaining to international armed conflict, has created a new category
of international war. Because of the interests of the Third World, supported by
the Socialists, international armed conflict has been defined to include "armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination. . . ." Therefore, in addition to the traditional category of
international war defined by a geo-military scale of violence reached only by
states, we will have international wars of self-determination-whatever the geo-
military scale and whatever the nature of the actors.'
This trend toward creating new categories of armed conflict in international
law permeates the second Protocol as well, for precisely opposite reasons on the
part of the Third World, somewhat reluctantly supported by the Socialists. The
second Protocol pertaining to internal war has been defined so as not to cover
the same ground as Common Article 3 of 1949, legally speaking. The Third
World did not want a second Protocol that would cover all internal wars, only
those of some intensity. While the Third World sought to extend international
legal regulation to wars of self-determination, it wanted to restrict specific
legal regulation of internal wars to the upper end of the scale of violence.
rhe subject is given detailed examination in D. Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on
Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AJIL 77-91 (1975). Cf. R.R. Baxter, Humanitarian
Law or Humanitarian Politics: The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1975).
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The combined effect of the two Protocols is to double the categories of armed
conflict from two to four: 1) traditional international armed conflict; 2) wars of
self-determination; 3) internal wars in which "dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups .... under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of [the] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement the [second] Protocol"; 4) all
other non-international armed conflicts. 3
Moreover, the relationship of the two Protocols to the 1949 code of law is less
than perfectly clear, for the Protocols supplement but do not erase-necessar-
ily-the content of the 1949 law. Some of the articles in the Protocols state that
the corresponding article in the Conventions remains unaltered. Yet the new
wording is not always the same as the old, even on the same subject. 4
Furthermore, the four Conventions plus the two Protocols total over 600
articles, with some of the individual articles being extremely long and complex. I
Inevitably, the decision-makers, judicial or otherwise, can be expected to have
some difficulty in interpreting the emerging law-to say nothing of the problems
confronting military personnel who must implement most of the law.
This, however, is not the only attitude shared. It is said the law of war was
already complicated, and that this Conference merely accentuated already
existing trends of legalism. Some observers even hold that the 1970s version of
complexity is an improvement over, say, the 1907 rules of aerial bombard-
ment-hardly the classic example of legal simplicity. On the other hand it can be
said that the current Conference has done nothing to correct past trends toward
excessive detail and legal hairsplitting that is without relevance to armed
conflicts in the real world.
Perhaps, in the view of some, legal complexity is necessary for reaching
compromises in a fragmented political world. But there is also the feeling that
some parts of the law represent only propaganda and symbolic concerns. It is
said by some Western delegates that the section of Protocol I on wars of
self-determination will never be invoked in actual violence-or at least not
mutually invoked. According to this view, that part of Protocol I is only a
propaganda victory for the anti-colonialists who are whipping a dead horse.
Hence the law as applied will be less complex than the law on the books-or so it
is argued.
3Governmental delegates who had negotiated the draft articles seemed confused on the number of
categories of armed conflict they had created, as reflected in 1976 debates. See Conference Document
CDDH/1/SR.23 at 2-9.4A number of new articles state that they do not "modify" the 1949 law, then proceed to state new
norms in different language for old subjects. It is not clear to this observer which version will be
controlling on a state that is party to both the 1949 and 1977 laws.
The situation is well analyzed in Baxter, Some Existing Problems of Humanitarian Law, LA
NOTION DE CONFLIT ARmg INTERNATIONAL: NOUVELLES PERSPECTIVES (1974).
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Finally, it can be recalled that since much of humanitarian law is never
adjudicated, the solution to past violations and deficiencies is to enact more-
and complicated-law. While for some, this point may help to explain the
complexity of the law, it does little to alleviate problems of interpretation and
implementation.
The evaluation of this complexity is itself not free from questions.
2. Lack of Control Mechanisms
Despite the complexity and unclear language of past and emerging
humanitarian law, the Protocols create no mechanism to issue an authoritative
ruling on claims arising from that law. International legal processes have long
shown a certain inadequacy in defining wars of self-determination, traditional
international war, and internal war. Certainly there is no provision in the
Protocols, adopted or submitted, which allows a participant to rule
authoritatively on the initial applicability of any part of humanitarian law.
The Protecting Power System under Protocol I comes into play only after the
combatting parties themselves have reached a (not always common) judgment
concerning what law applies. 6 Even the Protecting Power's role in seeing that
the law is implemented, after a belligerent's judgment on applicability,
represents a backward step from the 1949 law. Under the 1949 drafting, an
organization like the ICRC could present itself to belligerents as a substitute for
the Protecting Power if such a party had not been appointed; and in that
situation belligerents were obligated to accept such an offer. As of 1975, this
right of access for a would-be automatic substitute for the Protecting Power was
made dependent upon ad hoc consent by the belligerent.
On the other hand, in 1975 the Conference strengthened the procedure by
which Protecting Powers or their state-appointed substitutes were appointed. A
provision was adopted which had the effect of exerting pressure on a belligerent
to appoint a Protecting Power. But the process remains subject to mutual
consent by the belligerents. The rights of the Red Cross and other "impartial
and efficacious" parties were slightly strengthened. But, in general, Protocol I
makes only very slight improvements over the weak de jure and de facto
supervisory mechanisms extant from 1949-improvements accompanied by
some setbacks.
With respect to the impact of Protocol 11 on internal war, the 1949 right of the
combatants to call upon an impartial and effective body such as the ICRC to
help in implementing the Protocol, was not reaffirmed; and it was only after
extended debate and maneuvering that the right of the ICRC to offer its services
'Seefurther D. Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 70 AJIL 41 (1976).
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was adopted in Committee by a two-to-one vote (but not two-thirds). India and
Iraq have served notice that they will continue the fight to remove the
entire article on "Cooperation in the Implementation of the Protocol," which
demonstrates graphically the depth of desire of some Third World states to
leave Protocol II's implementation almost totally to the discretion of the parties
to the conflict.
Yet this criticism quickly runs up against the view that authoritative control
mechanisms in Protocol I are simply unrealistic in the current world. And under
Protocol II, visits by an impartial humanitarian body to persons detained by
reason of the conflict are almost required and certainly expected (". . . the
parties . . . shall endeavour to facilitate visits. . . ."). This is a clear
progressive development over the 1949 law, which was silent on detention visits,
save for inferences derived from Common Article 3.V
A further general subject to be negotiated in 1977 is the matter of an Inquiry
Commission under Protocol I (proposed by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
New Zealand) and an Enforcement Commission (proposed by Pakistan). This
matter possibly could make a large difference in how one evaluates control
procedures produced by the Conference, although it is unlikely.
Despite the fact that the greatest number of delegations speaking in
Committee I's general debate on this subject were in favor of some form of one
or the other of these proposals, the prospects are not encouraging. The Socialist
group was opposed to a change in the 1949 law, which subjects inquiries into
violations on ad hoc state consent. The United States and United Kingdom
statements were-to be charitable-vaguely cautious, while the Swiss statement
was explicitly reserved. No matter how large the number of states favorable to
the idea of inquiries and/or enforcements, if the United States and the Soviet
Union are not favorably disposed, there will be no general legal development.
(And quaere, whether Pakistan has thought not merely of India but also of
Pakistan; or whether Syrian support will exist in 1977 when Syria reflects not
just on Israel but on Syria's position in Lebanon.)'
The Socialist group will certainly never accept compulsory inquiry, much less
compulsory enforcement. Its views toward defending claims of national
'On efforts of the ICRC to supervise the implementation of Common Article 3, see M. Veuthey, Les
Conflits Armds de Caract'ere Non International et le Droit Humanitaire, CURRENT PROBLEMS OF
INT'L LAW (1975); and JAMES E. BOND, THE RULES OF ROT (1974). The present author has
analyzed recent Conference events in LegalManagement of Internal War: The 1977Protocol on Non'
International Armed Conflict, mimeo, 35 pp.
'The four-power proposal is found in CDDH/I/241/Add.1. It was amended by Japan in
CDDH/l/316. It can be compared with the Pakistani proposal in CDDH/I/267. According to this
author's tally at the 1976 session, twenty-four delegates spoke in favor of an inquiry and/or
enforcement commission, five seemed ambivalent in their comments, and nine (eight Socialists plus
an Indian) were clearly opposed.
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sovereignty are well known and were demonstrated in 1975 by unyielding
opposition to the idea of automatic substitutes for Protecting Powers. If there is
to be any legal development on the subject of an Inquiry Commission, it will be
left to the United States and its allies to cooperate in the drafting of an optional
mechanism which the parties can accept or not 'a la the European Human
Rights Convention and its optional protocols on implementing that Convention.
Indeed, one wonders why optional protocols have not been used before in the
law of armed conflict. As the law now exists, parties append reservations, which
means the law is not the same for all parties anyway. And proceeding on
universal consensus means the law always reflects the lowest common
denominator-viz., the law tends to reflect the least progressive views.
Recent research shows that inquiry commissions have not worked well in
world affairs in general, not just under the laws of war. 9 But at least the optional
protocol (or optional article) approach means that when and if states sign on,
the law might actually impose important obligations.
It is clear Protocol II will not have any significant machinery for de jure
supervision.
3. Scope of Protocol II
It is said that the reduced scope of Protocol II, and specifically its not being
coterminous with Common Article 3 of 1949, reduces the importance of the
Protocol to the point of extinction-especially since the greater the intensity of
internal war, the more likely the parties are to profess adherence to the
principles of the entire complex of 1949 Conventions (as occurred in the Congo
and Nigeria, for example).
But it is also the judgment of some that the material field of application of
Protocol II is not as narrow as certain Western delegates have assumed.II Some
delegates feel that a rather large number of violent situations logically fall under
that Protocol. Territory does not have to be held continuously by dissident
forces, and it would not require very much for the dissidents to show a good
'See NIssIM BAR-YAACOv, THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY
(1974).
"Article 1 of Protocol I1 reads:
The present Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by article 1 of Protocol 1 and which take place
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces
or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement the present Protocol.
The present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts.
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faith effort to apply the Protocol. Thus, if dissidents intermittently controlled
territory and opened controlled hospitals and detention centers to the ICRC, a
government might feel constrained to apply the Protocol.
Nevertheless, the Protocol's different scope of application, by contrast to
Common Article 3's undefined but broader reach, provides governments room
to maneuver should they seek to avoid applying the Protocol-an all too likely
possibility.
4. No Agreements on Weapons
The Conference has also been seized of the question of weapons that may
cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects." The Swedish
initiative, pursued with determination and now pressed by some dozen states,
has yet to produce any draft articles reflecting agreement which could serve as a
starting point for Protocol III. The Soviet Union has been the most vocal in
opposing the Swedish proposal. Elements on the military side of the American
delegation could hardly be unhappy with this development. For the Soviets
appear as the "bad guys," and in the process the United States is relieved of the
need to take a stand on napalm, booby traps, small calibre projectiles, dart
weapons, plastic weapons and the like.
So far the Pentagon appears unmoved by the Swedish and Swiss willingness to
give up napalm completely-a weapon which both possess. While some limited
agreements yet may be reached regarding uses of "booby traps" or other
weapons, three years of negotiations have not produced significant agreement.
Holland and Norway, among NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, have placed
some specific proposals on the table regarding limitations on the uses of certain
weapons. But most NATO and Warsaw Pact countries seem decidedly unen-
thusiastic about negotiating "the weapons question." There is general con-
sensus, articulated by Mexico at the 1976 plenary session, that results on this
aspect of the Conference have been extremely disappointing. The outlook is
for more of the same.
Possible Forward Movement
1. Civilian Protection
If there is consensus that "the weapons question" is the least positive aspect
of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference, there may also be consensus that the
most positive aspect is the effort to protect civilians in an international armed
"See ICRC, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS (1976); Hans Blix, Current Efforts To Prohibit the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,
IV INSTANT RESEARCH ON PEACE AND VIOLENCE 21-31 (1974); and ESBiORN ROSENBLAD,
PROHIBITED WEAPONS-TREATIES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1974).
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conflict. There is a widespread belief that the emerging law on this subject is
both a considerable development beyond the comparable provisions in the 1949
law (and the 1907 Hague Rules) and is capable of being implemented in a
practicable way. As examples, delegates are prone to cite several articles in the
first Protocol. Article 46 prohibits attacks on the "civilian population as such"
and "methods intended to spread terror among the civilian population";
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilian population and goods,
even though legitimate military objectives may be in the area; and reprisals
against civilians. Article 48 states that it "is forbidden to attack or destroy
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. . . ." Article 52
prohibits attacks on "non-defended localities." Other articles have been
tentatively adopted which pertain to civilian protection. Provisions on civilian
relief-e.g., the right of humanitarian assistance to enter a conflict area
expeditiously-will be negotiated in 1977. Certain legal problems remain, as in
the past, such as the precise meaning of an attack inflicting disproportionate
damage to civilian population and goods in the light of legitimate military
neeessity. But whatever law eventually exists on the books will clearly reflect a
general desire to increase the protection due to civilians.
2. Medical Law
Widespread agreement prevails that the Conference has made whatever
technical adjustments are necessary to adapt the medical portions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions to modern international warfare. Committee II made rapid
and extensive progress, particularly in the multi-dimensional subject of
facilitating the operation of medical aircraft in battle areas. Virtually the only
criticism one hears of the work of that Committee is that its progress is almost
entirely technical in nature and that its draft articles are ultimately dependent
for their implementation on articles drafted in other Committees. Nevertheless,
medical law in future international armed conflicts would seem to specify what
be done by whom, i.e., under what conditions can a belligerent compel medical
aircraft to land and be searched, and what can that belligerent do if the aircraft
has, or has not, observed the rules.
3. Protocol II, in the Large
Despite the possibly pessimistic view that the restricted scope of the second
Protocol on internal war, compared to both Common Article 3 and what the
ICRC proposed to the Conference, makes that Protocol relatively insignificant,
the Protocol is believed to be important. Aside from whether its scope will be
defined more broadly than the pessimists predict, some delegates believe the
instrument has symbolic importance. Not to approve it could be seen as a
concession to those Third World states like India and Iraq most opposed to
further development of international law for internal wars. Not to develop more
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specific law for non-international armed conflict, even if only for internal wars
of high intensity, could serve to arrest further legal developments in this area.
To abandon the Protocol could be seen as support for the double standard so
unabashedly articulated by India in the 1976 plenary. In India's view, Common
Article 3 from 1949 is only for colonial situations, not for internal wars in the
developing nations (which, incidentally, is contrary to what India argued in
1974-i.e., heretofore, internal wars in colonial situations were international
wars, an argument logically leaving Common Article 3 to regulate all other
internal wars including those in developing nations).
Whatever the scope of Protocol II when authoritatively interpreted, some
delegates believe that instrument constitutes a positive development. The
Protocol is said to have long-range significance for future legislative efforts,
despite the probability that many Third World states will not bring it into legal
force and effect.
4. Penal Law
Committee I has reached agreement on what constitutes "grave breaches" of
humanitarian law requiring individual punishment. This development is of
considerable practical importance. It advances the historical trend of
incorporating criminal justice into the humanitarian objectives pursued at
Geneva since 1949. In fact, justice can now legally replace charity. And, legal
developments refine the concept of individual responsibility for certain crimes of
war (a subject to be dealt with more directly in certain articles still being
negotiated). 2
Some delegates find it encouraging that the Conference has tentatively
described what constitutes the grave breaches mentioned more generally in the
1949 Code. 3 One category of grave breaches is non-controversial and
compromises such delicts as: knowingly attacking a person who is hors de
combat, attacking "works or installations containing dangerous forces (e.g.,
dams, dikes) with the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of
life," attacking DMZs, making "perfidious use" of the Red Cross and other
"protective" signs, and so on.
A second category encompasses: engaging in the forced movement of certain
persons by an occupying power, attacking certain cultural property, engaging in
"unjustifiable delay" in repatriating prisoners of war, depriving a protected
person of the right to a "fair and regular trial," and more controversial (for both
lrIhe trend in Conference debates is to emphasize legal responsibility for superior rather than
subordinate officers, without completely removing individual responsibility for each member of a
military establishment.
"See CDDH/l/332 and CDDH/I/326.
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its irrelevance and its political overtones), practicing apartheid and certain other
forms of racial discrimination.
Beyond the controversy over this second category of grave breaches-breaches
which do not necessarily involve loss of life or major damage to human health-
some reservations are held concerning the entire process of emphasizing penal
law in humanitarian instruments. Apprehensions have been voiced that the
Communist camp or others would prosecute foreign detainees and in so doing
terminate humanitarian legal protection upon convictions-based upon less
protective national standards. Indeed, Communist nations had already qualified
their obligations under parts of the 1949 Conventions by a reservation in this vein,
i.e., the protection of the Third Convention ceases when a prisoner of war is
convicted of a war crime, as decided by national courts. 14
Nevertheless, many consider the consensus adoption of Article 74 of Protocol
I on grave breaches to be a positive step in general, indicating the strength of the
commitment to enforce certain prohibitions of humanitarian law.
5. Prisoner of War Protection
Finally, while a definition of the term "prisoner of war" has not yet been
approved, one version has attracted considerable support. Its approval in some
form is likely very early in the fourth session. This informal consensus is
regarded by many as a favorable development-especially since the Americans
and North Vietnamese (among others) seem to be in agreement.
A working group has proposed a definition of a prisoner of war which
implicitly utilizes the "separate but equal" concept."5 Certain combatant
detainees would be prisoners of war in the full legal sense-e.g., those
combatants in international armed conflict displaying arms openly "during
each military engagement" and preceding attack when deploying and "visible to
the adversary." Other detained combatants, failing to meet the rules on open
weapons, forfeit prisoner of war status, but are to be "given protection
equivalent in all respects to prisoners of war."
If this draft article 42 of Protocol I is adopted, it will basically formalize
practices in South Vietnam and Algeria, inter alia, where not only traditionally
attired soldiers were given de facto prisoner of war status, but also many
irregular fighters captured in combat. Even this act of formalizing some past
practice was difficult to achieve. But the subject of protection of mercenaries is
still characterized by much disagreement; it is a subject that may have to be
treated in an article separate from the main prisoner of war article in order to
"See CLAUDE PILLOUD, RESERVATIONS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (1976) at 27-34.
ICDDH/III/362.
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preserve the consensus already obtained. 6 Still, informal Conference
developments through 1976 have updated the old Hague and Geneva rules
requiring combatants to wear uniforms and carry their arms openly at all times,
inter alia. The law has been adjusted-to some extent-to contemporary events.
Summary
Were one to summarize the results of the three conference sessions thus far,
one could discern some positive, forward steps, while possible backward steps or
steps characterized by marking time are subject to varying interpretations. Thus
it is said that the good things are really good, and the bad things are open to
question and may turn out to be negligible in importance. Civilian protection
and medical law are said to be clear steps forward; the complexity of the law in
general and the reduced scope of Protocol II are said to be not so injurious to
applied humanitarian protection and assistance-or at least not definitely
injurious at this point.
This view notwithstanding, it is difficult to formulate in satisfactory form a
summary of the three sessions of the Conference, in part because different
parties wanted and expected different things from the Conference. Whether a
step is forward or backward depends on the vantage point of the viewer. Many
Third World states sought to confer belligerent status on wars of self-determina-
tion against colonialism, and on guerrilla fighters. This they obtained. Many
Socialist states jealously wanted to preserve claims of national sovereignty-viz.,
to block authoritative supervision of the implementation of the law-and to
emphasize penal law. This they achieved. Many Western states wanted a second
Protocol on internal war, and to "educate" newer states in the law of armed
conflict. To some extent they were successful in this. The ICRC wanted to
improve civilian protection and also to "educate" non-Western parties in the
law. The first was clearly obtained. The second objective was-as for the West,
too-only a limited success. Many African and Asian states did not participate
daily in the Conference because of lack of staffing, if not lack of interest. And it
may have been the ICRC and the Western states that received the most
"education" from the first three sessions of the Conference-through learning
how the law would have to be shaped by the voting strength and political
preoccupations of the Third World, supported by the Socialists. Still, most
parties "gained" a considerable amount of what they wanted out of the
Conference. 7 (Each of the three major groupings did, of course, lose on some
items they urged.)
"A summary of competing views is found in CDDH/III/361/Add.1.
"For example, the United States lobbied vigorously-and successfully-for a new article on
Information on the Victims of a Conflict and Remains ofDeceased. See CDDH/II/395 for this rule on
Missing-In-Action (MIAs) and related subjects.
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If, however, one asks not whether states got what they wanted out of the
Conference, but whether future victims of armed conflicts should be noticeably
better off after this Conference, one cannot be certain that will be so. If the law
on the books is implemented, civilians clearly stand a better chance of avoiding
some of the horrors of war and injured combatants a better chance of rapid
evacuation. But on the crucial question of authoritative determination of applica-
bility and implementation of the law, there were virtually no progressive
developments-and sometimes not even a simple reaffirmation, as on the
subjects of automatic substitutes for Protecting Powers and the role of the ICRC
in relation to internal war. It is not only the "what" but also the "who" that
counts in international law; and on the subject of who resolves competing claims
the Conference has accomplished virtually nothing.
If, therefore, one ignores the crucial questions of who decides when the law
applies and who supervises the implementation of the law, the Conference
seems to have taken a number of steps forward. When one adds to the
summary equation questions about application and implementation-not to
mention the weapons question-the Conference appears to be going nowhere.
Certainly the Conference is not going backward. (Some Western delegations
thought so after the 1974 session, but these delegations have come to live with-
but not really accept-the idea that wars of self-determination are ipso facto
international armed conflicts.)
Because, in sum, there has been some slight forward movement on civilian
and combatant protection, medical law, and law for internal war, the
Conference is likely at its fourth session to produce two instruments which
should be signed and ratified. Perhaps the most cogent reason for improving the
law of armed conflict in a slight forward step is that, at the next Diplomatic
Conference on the subject, one can approach the really fundamental questions of
application and supervision-questions on which, as already noted, this
Conference has basically stood still.
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